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Abstract 
This paper explores private investments in public equity (PIPE) deals as a means 
of alternative firm financing. Poorly performing companies often look towards PIPEs to 
quickly raise capital when traditional means of financing are limited. This study provides 
an analysis on both the discount and premia that PIPEs are issued at, as well as the 
performance of firms after the deal announcement. Overall, this study finds that 
successful PIPEs from the investor’s perspective are issued at a discount of close to 17%, 
and unsuccessful PIPEs are issued at an average of a 15% premium. I find substantial 
cumulative abnormal returns of 9% over a three-day period due to positive information 
shocks. Overall, this thesis corroborates past research in the field. 
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I. Introduction 
On April 26, 2019, both the S&P 500 and NASDAQ composite indexes achieved 
record highs, closing at 2,939.88 and 8,146.40, respectively (CNBC, 2019). Despite 
modest news of an oncoming recession, 2019 marks yet another strong period of 
performance. In fact, equity markets have experienced positive returns every year–except 
2018–since the 2008 Great Financial Crisis.1 Debt capital markets have also performed 
exceptionally well. Corporate bond issuances surpassed $1 trillion for the fifth year in a 
row, and is projected to continue growing (Barclays, 2019). “It’s easier to raise money 
[now] than any time… over the past 30 years,” said Carlyle Group founder David 
Rubenstein in 2018.  
There is plenty of evidence showing that stocks have performed well–but what 
about the companies that haven’t? Not every firm will be successful. Plenty of high 
quality companies end up strapped for cash due to poor investments, mismanagement, 
and a host of other reasons. Firms in this situation are faced with a tough choice. If 
management chooses not to cease operations, a likely pragmatic move is to raise more 
capital. But how exactly should a firm go about this?  
Debt financing may be difficult because firms, especially those with negative net 
income, may not have the means to pay back the interest. Equity investments may also be 
difficult. Firms can suffer from a lack of analyst coverage, poor trading volume, or 
insufficient funds to cover the costs of a second public offering (Hogboom, 2004).  
                                                 
1 The S&P 500 is used as a proxy for the equity markets. Returns retrieved from S&P Global 
website. 
2 
 
A. What is a PIPE? 
This paper takes a deeper look into private investments in public equity, or PIPEs, 
as an alternative method of raising capital. PIPEs are a special type of deal that involve 
an investor–such as a corporation, asset manager, or high net-worth individual–
purchasing equity in a public company.2 PIPEs provide a quick means of capital for firms 
in desperate need. For perspective, PricewaterHouseCoopers (2017) finds that a typical 
initial public offering (IPO) can take as long as 12 months of work; a PIPE can take as 
little as a few days. The catch is that PIPEs are issued with an assortment of deal 
sweeteners and stipulations. 
Most notably, PIPEs are often issued at a discount to the market value of equity. 
Target firms typically need immediate capital to survive, so they have no choice but to 
accept a lower valuation. Lim, Schwert, and Weisbach (2017) find that over 90% of firms 
issuing PIPEs are worth under $1 billion in market capitalization and have a median book 
asset value of only $51 million. Further, I find that the majority of firms that issue PIPEs 
have negative net income and junk rated credit. 
Additionally, PIPEs are typically issued with restricted shares, which are then 
registered at a later date.3 The discount factors in the illiquidity that investors face due to 
the lack of resale rights until the issuing firm registers the shares (Hogboom, 2004).  
                                                 
2 A public company is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a firm that 
trades its securities in a public marketplace, and reports specific financial and business information to the 
public on a regular basis. 
3 Restricted equity is defined by the SEC as a security that is acquired in a private sale that may 
not be resold on an exchange, pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933. When a firm issues 
restricted equity, it promises to file for registration to give the investor the option to sell their stake.  
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Stock warrants are also often added as a sweetener for the investor. A warrant is 
similar to a stock option in that it allows an investor to purchase shares in a company in 
the future at a specified price. Warrants have often been criticized for being predatory. 
They generally contain extreme repricing rights and antidilutive conditions if the strike 
price is not achieved (Hogboom, 2004). Hogboom also finds that warrants are often used 
as retribution if the issuing firm does not register the equity on time. Lim, Schwert, and 
Weisbach (2017) find that its inclusion dramatically increases the size of the discount.  
Not all PIPEs come at a discount. In 2016, Google’s private equity arm Google 
Capital (GC) purchased a $46.35 million stake in Care.com, an online provider of family 
care and home services. GC paid a 24% premium to the market value of equity 
(TechCrunch, 2016). TechCrunch notes that the firm suffered from typical ailments 
discussed earlier: poor financial performance and poor float. This made a PIPE issuance 
an attractive option. In the days after the deal announcement, TechCrunch notes that its 
market capitalization nearly doubled.  
This begs the question of how best to calculate the placement discount. A naïve 
estimation of discount is simply a ratio of the PIPE equity value to the market equity 
value. But markets exhibit semi-strong form efficiency, where stock prices reflect new 
information (Fama, 1965). Therefore, a better measure of discount incorporates sufficient 
time for the market to price in new information. Hertzel and Smith (1993) call this the 
“with information” discount, and is measured as the relationship between the PIPE equity 
value and the market value of equity ten days after the deal announcement. Therefore, a 
PIPE is classified as placed at a discount if the “with information” market price exceeds 
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the placement price. Likewise, a PIPE is classified as a premium if the placement price 
exceeds the “with information” market price. This definition is structurally different than 
the naïve interpretation. PIPE investors mandate a discount–in the naïve sense–almost 
always. But the true performance of the deal is a function of the pricing in of new 
information. 
The amalgamation of deal sweeteners and the placement discount contribute to 
substantial alpha for investors. Lim, Schwert, and Weisbach (2017) report that investors 
earn an average of 4% abnormal return using a PIPE announcement play over a four day 
window. Hertzel and Smith (1993) find similar abnormal returns of 4.4% over the same 
period. 
B. Hypotheses  
This paper studies the sources PIPE discounts, as well as firm performance 
around the deal announcement. Hertzel and Smith (1993) originally hypothesized in their 
seminal paper that discounts are a function of asymmetric information about firm value. 
The global economy has changed dramatically since the paper’s publication, so this study 
serves to update their study with present-day information.  
The main hypotheses are: 
1. Hertzel and Smith Information Hypothesis: Firms where the capacity for 
asymmetric information is high will continue to have steeper discounts. 
a. More specifically, these will generally be smaller companies in 
capital-intensive industries enduring financial distress. 
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b. Firms where the PIPE is placed at a discount are fundamentally 
different than firms where PIPEs are placed at a premium. 
2. Positive shock hypothesis: Firms will exhibit positive abnormal returns in the 
short term due to positive sentiment from the PIPE announcement. Longer 
term abnormal return will likely be negative due to the introduction of new 
information.  
As an aside, the Care.com deal referenced earlier in this section forms the 
motivation for this study. I participated in Claremont McKenna College’s Silicon Valley 
Program during my junior year of college, where I interned with Care.com. This is where 
I first learned of private placements as a method of financing. Since then, I have been 
interested in sources of private placement discounts and premia, and used this study as an 
opportunity to explore this interest.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I provide a review of the 
relevant literature on PIPEs and the implications of their use. In Section III, I describe my 
data sources and methodologies. As I discuss the data, I also provide some insightful 
market trends. In Section IV, I discuss my results. This section is broken into two parts. 
The first is a discussion of PIPE discounts in relation to firm attributes, followed by a 
multivariate regression analysis. The second part presents an event study around the deal 
announcement period. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper by summarizing the 
arguments, identifying limitations of the study, and offering future points of research.  
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II. Literature Review 
There is meaningful research on PIPEs as an alternative method of capital raising, 
but much of it is dated and may no longer accurately represent the current economic 
situation. Among the most notable research is done by Hertzel and Smith (1993), which 
explores reasons for both the equity discount and post-PIPE performance. Hertzel and 
Smith hypothesize that discounts on private placements arise from asymmetric 
information, in both the value of public information, and in anticipated changes in 
managerial performance. The authors find that private placement discounts are associated 
with the costs of uncovering the asymmetric information, and that deeper discounts are 
linked with higher discovery costs. Deep discounts also are typical for smaller 
placements, with the discount decreasing as the placement amount increases. In terms of 
performance, the Hertzel and Smith find that there is significant positive market reaction 
which drives up firm share price but is not sustainable in the long term.  
A similar study was conducted to examine private placement discounts in China 
(Lu, Si-fei, & Wei-xing, 2011). The authors find that Chinese PIPEs act in similar fashion 
to American PIPEs. Investors still get the benefit of deep equity discounts, and positive 
market reactions still occur on average. However, the study finds that equity discounts 
may be even deeper for Chinese firms than American firms, and the {-3,0} day period 
has higher returns on average. These findings are in line with Hertzel and Smith’s 
findings.  
A more recent study shows that firms seeking private placements will overstate 
their earnings in the reporting quarter preceding the PIPE (Chen et al., 2008). 
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Specifically, current accruals will be overstated in an effort to portray increased revenue. 
A sophisticated investor, therefore, will require a deeper discount on equity to account for 
the inflated earnings. The authors estimate that the mean discount is 10%. Further, the 
magnitude of overstatement is directly related to the long-term performance of the firm, 
where more aggressive earnings inflation leads to worse long-term performance. In the 
short term, however, market reactions to private placements are generally very positive, 
with the discount-adjusted cumulative abnormal return averaging almost 16% in the {-3, 
0} period. 
Work has also been published on the types of investors that place engage in 
PIPEs, including deal structure and post equity-issuance performance. Brophy, Ouimet & 
Sialm (2004) finds that firms that receive private placements from hedge funds typically 
perform worse that firms that find other types of investors. In terms of deal structure, the 
study analyzes both traditional and structured PIPEs. Firms that issue structured PIPEs 
perform worse than firms that issue traditional PIPEs. This happens because of the 
generous repricing rights granted to investors in structured deals that activate when the 
stock price falls. In contrast with the Chen et al. study, this paper does not find abnormal 
returns for traditional PIPES from non-hedge fund investors.  
In terms of the PIPE underwriting, Erhemjamts and Raman (2012) find that 
investment bank reputation plays an important role in the equity discount. They find that 
over 90% of firms use placement agents like banks, and moreover, that agent reputation 
is correlated to more profitable and liquid investments. Since agents act as information 
intermediaries, the presence of a more reputable bank on the deal may indicate large 
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asymmetries. Interestingly, when firms partner with reputable agents, their equity is sold 
at a lower discount relative to firms with less reputable agents. However, the authors find 
that more frequent contact with agents is correlated to higher fees. Further, banks are able 
to have a more sustained flow of material non-public information, meaning that a long 
relationship indicates both information asymmetry and a good investment opportunity.  
On a broader level, Chem, Dai, and Schatzberg (2008) conducted research on 
financing options for firms, specifically between PIPEs and secondary equity offerings 
(SEOs). Both methods of post-IPO financing are important for firms, but PIPEs may have 
better properties for firms. These properties stem into three categories. First, firms may 
not have enough access to capital to engage in an SEO, meaning that the PIPE market is 
much larger and more accessible. Second, as Hertzel and Smith found, there is a high 
degree of information asymmetry due to the undervaluation of firms requiring injections. 
Therefore, firms will typically choose to have a private placement in hopes that the 
relative discount on equity will be smaller than if raising capital through the public 
markets. Lastly, issuance costs are lower for PIPEs than for SEOs, so any rational, cost-
minimizing firm will choose a PIPE instead. 
Lim, Schwert, and Weisbach (2017) conducted a comprehensive study on the deal 
terms of PIPEs, specifically in the context of determining the cost of issuance. In addition 
to studying the discount and returns of deals, the authors cover the implications of the 
equity issuance themselves. First, they note that an overwhelming majority the 
transactions sell unregistered shares. Thus, investors cannot sell their equity until the 
shares are registered with the SEC, which often takes up to 100 days. In terms of deal 
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structure, the authors note that almost half of PIPE issuances involve structured products 
like stock warrants. Using the Black-Scholes model, they find that the inclusion of 
warrants nearly doubles the average placement discount from 6.3% to 11.2%. Abnormal 
returns for the PIPE investor increase significantly too. 
Finally, Chakraborty and Gantchev (2012) propose an alternative role for private 
placements: that PIPEs can increase shareholder coordination and help lower chances of 
default. Because many features of PIPE investments require shareholder approval, such 
as issuing more than 20% of outstanding shares at a discount, the authors of this paper 
study congruency between shareholder votes in the context of raising capital. The study 
finds that increased coordination of incumbent shareholders leads to a decreased private 
placement discount. Additionally, the authors find that PIPEs increase the financial value 
of the firm post-issuance in the long term. This seems to be a direct contradiction to 
previous literature. However, the study finds that firms that engage in PIPEs have higher 
probabilities of favorable debt renegotiations within a year of equity issuance. 
III. Data & Methodology 
A. Data Sources 
The data used in this study comes from three sources. The first dataset is provided 
by Pitchbook. The raw data is a panel comprised of all completed PIPE investments of 
American firms from December 1998 – November 2018.4 The observations were 
trimmed to only include those where the deal announcement date, deal size, and deal 
                                                 
4 The full dataset is much larger, but due to the lack of efficiency in the private markets, many 
observations were incomplete or incorrect. Each observation includes a description of the deal terms, which 
I used to validate the data. 
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share price are provided. I also stipulated that at least one investor is based in America. 
This yielded a sample size of 149 observations. When further trimmed to exclude 
observations where the percent acquired is not given, the sample size shrunk to 49 
observations. Because of the small sample size, the analysis in this paper will be done 
with the 149 observations that includes both known and unknown acquired percentages, 
except where otherwise noted. A complete list of variables and definitions can be seen in 
Table 1. 
The second and third datasets are provided via Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is used to gather a panel of 
daily stock data. It includes stock price, shares outstanding, and benchmark daily returns, 
and is used to extrapolate market capitalization and cumulative abnormal return.5 CapIQ, 
provided by S&P Global, is also used. It includes firm financial metrics and credit ratings 
by date. 
B. Methodology 
Python is used to query, clean, and analyze the dataset. To query the stock-level 
data, I use the firm list from Pitchbook to pull the associated ticker data from CRSP. 
However, since PitchBook and CRSP do not use the same identification system, each 
ticker is first matched to a PERMCO, a unique firm identifier provided by CRSP. Each 
ticker is queried for data in the period {-30} and {-4, 10}, where negative numbers 
represent days prior to day 0 and positive numbers represent days following day 0. Day 0 
is defined as the announcement date of the PIPE, which is provided by PitchBook. Day  
                                                 
5 The benchmark selected is the S&P500. 
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{-30} is used to compute the firm market capitalization without any noise from the PIPE 
announcement. Finally, the Python package Pandas Market Calendars is used to remove 
weekends, holidays, and other non-trading days from the queried data. 
To query the financial information from CapIQ, I first had to map each ticker to a 
GVKEY, since S&P uses yet another identification scheme. Using a GVKEY and 
announcement day pair, I collected information from the 10-Q that precedes the PIPE 
announcement, so no information bias is factored into the ratios. 
The two main dependent variables, the market discount and cumulative abnormal 
return, are given by the equations: 
𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕 =
(𝑷𝒊,𝒕+𝟏𝟎−𝑷
∗
𝒊)
𝑷𝒊,𝒕+𝟏𝟎
     ( 1 )  
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = ∑ 𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑬(𝑹𝒊,𝒕)
𝒕=𝑻
𝒕=𝟏      ( 2 ) 
The discount for deal i is measured by the change in stock price ten days after the 
deal announcement day (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+10) and the share price that the investor paid (𝑃
∗
𝑖
), divided 
by the stock price 10 days after the deal announcement. This is the same formula used by 
Hertzel and Smith. The metric reflects the magnitude of the private placement discount 
for the investor with information. The parity of the sign on Discount represents if the 
investor paid a discount (positive) or premium (negative) relative to the trading price. 
This methodology of calculating discount is used as opposed to the ratio of the current 
trading price and investor share price because it prices in the information shocks 
embedded within the announcement period. 
The discount is studied in two ways. First, I show the relationship between 
discount and different firm attributes. The attributes studied comprise of financial, 
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investment related, and firm related metrics. The second uses OLS multivariate 
regression to explore different factor determinants and weights of the discount.  
Yet, research shows that oftentimes firms actually pay a premium for shares. This 
paper is novel in that it conducts regressions at the aggregate level, and then breaks it 
down to the discount-only and premium-only level. This provides insight into overall 
factors of private placement discounts, as well as specific factors that are unique to 
discounts and premia individually.  
To measure the returns for each deal, I use a cumulative abnormal return (CAR). 
This is the sum of the abnormal returns from period {t, T}. The stock expected return 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is calculated using a Fama-French three-factor model, which takes into account 
factors including size, book to market value, and market capitalization. I use this model 
rather than a market model because more of the variation in returns is explained. I use a 
cumulative measure for the event study because it allows for information to become 
priced in at any date during the study period. The CAR is specified with the following 
estimation parameters. The window used to estimate the expected return is 100 days, and 
there is a 50-day gap between the estimation window and event study period. 
C. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
In-Sample Data. 
Summary statistics for the sample can be seen in Table 2. The sample 
corroborates that a typical firm that engages in a PIPE is midsized and poorly performing. 
The average firm age is around 35 years old and employs over 2000 people. These seem 
like healthy metrics, yet, the financial metrics tell another story. The mean market 
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capitalization is just under $200 million, but the median market capitalization is only 
$20.69 million. Further, the standard deviation of firm size is enormous. Cash flow 
margin is negative on average. And even though mean firm net income is $42 million, it 
has a standard deviation of $848 million. These data corroborate the notion that 
struggling companies are often a target demographic for private placements. It also 
portrays the deal-by-deal nature of PIPEs.  
Regarding the actual investment, the median deal profile is fairly small, at only 
$25 million. Deal size varies drastically, with it ranging between $30,000 and $3.7 
billion. Investors typically seek an 18% stake but can approach almost 50%. It is 
important to note the limited amount of observations for this variable. This is attributable 
to either Pitchbook not providing the metric for all of its observations, or by nature of the 
private markets not disclosing all the deal terms. 
Investments are often syndicated among multiple investors. The average number 
of investors in-sample is 1.93 firms, with a maximum of eight. Interestingly, there is 
evidence that the buy-side firms investing in PIPE issuances have different incentives 
than firms that invest at earlier stages of a firm’s life. Out of the 1.93 investors, 1.71 of 
the investors are new. Investors understand that the target is typically performing poorly 
and that future returns are uncertain. Yet, they still require a discount to market value 
even though it will degrade the firm’s valuation. So rather than having a traditional 
growth thesis, buying parties have much more leeway on the target’s performance. 
Evidence from Brophy, Ouimet & Sialm (2004) suggests that investors with high risk 
tolerance–such as hedge funds–stipulate sweeteners like convertible debt and repricing 
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rights in the case of poor performance that lead to higher returns for the fund but can be 
detrimental to the firm. The study also highlights how hedge funds typically hedge their 
investments, increasing the likelihood of returns regardless of the firm’s performance. 
PIPE Market Trends. 
Table 3 provides some insight into the marketplace for private placements. 
Overall, there are 2546 deals captured by Pitchbook between 1998 and 2018. Because the 
sample used in this study only includes observations with sufficient data, I inspect both 
in-sample and out-of-sample PIPE trends as a sanity check. Both Figure 1 and Figure 3 
exhibit the same trends and properties, which ensures that the sample is a fair 
representation of the population. Figure 2 and Figure 4 are the percent changes of yearly 
deals in and out of sample. Interestingly the process in Figure 4 is fairly stationary, 
except structural breaks in 1994, 1999, and 2008, which coincide with the 1994 Great 
Bond Massacre, 1999 Dot-Com bubble burst in, and 2008 Great Financial Crisis. 
In terms of firm composition, Figure 5 shows that Healthcare firms are most 
likely to raise money privately, in line with the paper’s hypothesis. This is likely due to 
capital-intensive pharma companies requiring quick cash injections to recover costs 
associated with expensive FDA trials or failures.  
Lastly, Figure 6 looks at the number of days between the PIPE announcement and 
the actual day it is executed. Interestingly, only 30% of firms execute the deal within a 
week of announcement. Almost 50% of firms take more than a month from the 
announcement date to execute the deal. Perhaps firms try to capitalize on positive 
information effects twice: once from the announcement and again from the close.  
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IV. Results 
Discounts and Premia 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of Discount. It is approximately normal but is 
moderately negatively skewed and has slightly thin tails. As a sanity check, is worth 
nothing that the distribution is centered on a positive mean, which represents a discount. 
However, it is still interesting to see a large number of investors paying a premium. 
Table 4 helps explain this by presenting key descriptive statistics about Discount. 
The ‘aggregate’ column describes the entire sample, and the proceeding columns describe 
the subset of PIPEs where the deal is effectively a discount or premium, respectively.  
In the aggregate, investors on average pay a 6.56% discount to the market value 
of equity. But that number does not tell the whole story. The true discount that investors 
receive is much closer to 20%. But the discount also varies drastically, with a standard 
deviation of over 21%. This is attributable to the wide range of reasons that firms seek 
private investment, as well as from a variety of firm-specific characteristics including 
profitability and lifecycle stage.  
In regard to the premium, I find that firms end up effectively paying about 11-
17% above market rate. There are two likely reasons that a firm would pay a premium. 
Fund managers may pay a premium to outbid competition in pursuit of alpha. As the 
number of PIPEs per year generally increases, investment firms may engage in bidding 
wars with each other, which in turn drives up the investment price. The second theory is 
that investors negatively reacted to the deal announcement and drove share price down. 
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Discounts and Firm Attributes. 
Table 5 takes a deeper look into the drivers of PIPE discounts. Discount and 
premium magnitude do not exhibit much variation between industries. Private markets 
are likely deep and liquid enough that firms can seek investment from any accredited 
investor, regardless of industry experience. It is interesting to note that the absolute value 
of an industry’s discount tends to be close to its premium. This implies that information 
shocks are just as strong in both the positive and negative directions.  
Regarding specific industries, IT firms tend to have the tightest range. This is 
likely due to the oversaturation of private technology investors driving prices towards 
their fair values. Additionally, the opportunity cost of raising money by other means may 
be too costly. Many public technology companies have negative net income, which 
makes paying off debt payments difficult. And equity financing may not be possible due 
to low trading volume.  
Next, using net income as a proxy for profitability, it is not a surprise that 
unprofitable firms have a much steeper discount than profitable ones. Market investors 
are expected to react positively to the capital injection. This supports the thesis that 
positive information effects are stronger for less profitable firms.  
Credit rating is used as one of the proxies for financial distress. Firms with poor 
credit rating tend to receive both the highest premium and discount. The former is likely 
due to positive information effects. The latter hints at the predatory nature of some PIPEs, 
whereby some deals do not end up being good values for the firm. Overall, this more 
importantly shows that firms with poor credit are more likely to be PIPE targets. There 
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are more firms in-sample with C rated credit than firms of all other credit scores 
combined.  
Percent acquired seems to be an important factor for discount magnitude. 
Intuitively, it makes sense that larger fractions come at steeper discount. Investors require 
compensation for larger ownership positions in the form of a market discount. Most 
PIPEs occur between the 10-20% level. Investors are unlikely to spend time and 
resources for smaller positions, and firms in financial distress will need to sacrifice a 
meaningful amount of equity to raise an adequate amount of capital. Rule 144A states 
that firms must receive shareholder approval before selling more than 20% of outstanding 
float.  
Along with percent acquired, deal size is an important determinant in discount. 
There are large discounts for $5-20 million deals. Interestingly, premium increases as the 
deal size increases. Larger deals likely signal deeper financial distress, which may scare 
investors.  
Book / market value of equity is used to describe a degree of over- or 
undervaluation of a firm. Higher values are expected to signal undervaluation. The results 
show a modest increase in discount as the ratio increases.  
The discount seems to be agnostic to firm size as measured by market 
capitalization. Even though the majority of firms are worth under $100 million, a firm of 
any size can issue a PIPE. It is expected that investors would require a naïve discount 
regardless of the firm size. It does not matter whether an investor places in a small bio-
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tech firm, or much larger cases, such as Berkshire Hathaway investing in Goldman 
Sach’s bailout private placement in 2008. 
Debt / equity is a good proxy for financial distress. The data shows the firms with 
extreme debt / equity receive steeper discounts. For example, firms with negative debt to 
equity have the steepest discount. This occurs when the book value of equity becomes 
negative due to negative retained earnings. Similarly, firms with debt / equity ratios of 10 
and above have steep discounts, likely as a reaction to the upcoming boost in equity.  
The sample is fairly evenly split between PIPEs with a single investor and PIPEs 
with multiple investors. In the aggregate, having multiple investors nearly doubles the 
average discount. This is likely a result of the asymmetric power that investors yield.  
Multivariate Regression Results. 
Table 6 presents six models for measuring the discount. All models were 
computed using linear regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Model (1) tries to model discount by using mixed effects. It projects the discount 
as a function of log of firm size, percent acquired, and an interaction term between the 
two. Overall, 29.4% of the variation in the discount is explained. The constant and market 
capitalization are both significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on constant is 0.331, 
and the coefficient on log of market cap is -0.101. Therefore, as firms become larger, the 
discount to share price becomes smaller. At the same time, as the percent acquired 
increases, the discount increases linearly.  
Model (2) builds off of (1) but adds a variable for log of deal size. Log of deal 
size and log of market cap are both significant at the 1% level. The constant loses some 
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power, becoming significant at the 5% level, and percent acquired loses significance. 
This model again shows that the discount transitions to a premium as the firm size grows. 
But the discount is increase as deal size grows too. This model predicts that a 10% 
increase in log of market cap would decrease the discount by 1.49 percentage points.  
Model (3) introduces credit rating and book / market equity and takes out the 
interaction variable. This model loses some predictive power compared to models (1) and 
(2). Only 22.6% of the variation in discount is described by this model. The coefficients 
on B+ and B rated credit are negative and not significant. However, the coefficient on a C 
rated credit is negative and significant at the 1% level. This model projects that it is 
beneficial to have poor credit rating. We have seen evidence of this before. As shown in 
the previous section, firms with low credit scores tend to also have the largest positive 
shareholder reaction. 
Therefore, model (4) attempts to control for credit by adding a debt / equity term. 
Cash flow margin is also added as an additional measure of financial distress. Credit 
rating C is still significant, but now at the 5% level, along with cash flow margin. This 
model, while only having an adjusted R^2 of 24.1%, starts to create an intuition for how 
the discount is modeled. The coefficients on all non-junk rated credit are insignificant. So 
even if a firm has good credit, it is not powerful enough to explain a premium or 
discount. On the other hand, a credit rating of C brings the discount down to under 10% 
from 29.2%. At the same time, the coefficient on cash flow margin is negative, meaning 
more efficient companies bring the discount down further towards a premium. Finally, 
log of market is significant at the 1% level, and has a negative coefficient. Therefore, a 
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discount is likely to turn into a premium with large, efficient firms that are going through 
financial troubles. 
Model (5) is based on the regression in Hertzel and Smith’s paper. 41.6% of the 
variation in discount is explained by this specification. Credit rating is removed and 
replaced with other metrics of financial distress. The new measures are two binary 
variables for profitability, “Generating Revenue; Not Profitable,” and “Profitable”. The 
former equals 1 if net income is negative and EBITDA growth is negative, and the latter 
equals 1 if a firm had year-over-year EBITDA growth accompanied with 
contemporaneous positive net income. These variables are not mutually exclusive, and a 
0 for both implies that a firm has no profit but increasing EBITDA growth. A binary 
variable for single investor is added to measure effects on number of investing 
participants. Percent acquired is also added back. 
There are several notable features about this model. First, the constant is negative, 
which implies that firms start at a premium, and certain characteristics drive the stock 
price towards discount. The two new profitability variables are both significant at the 5% 
level. Having no profit and decreasing EBITDA margin eliminates the premium entirely. 
This intuitively makes sense, as investors typically invest in companies with future 
potential growth, and this variable hints at the firm’s struggles. Having positive net 
income and EBITDA growth also wipes out most of the premium, interestingly. This may 
be due to investors’ willingness to pay closer to market price for these investments. 
Again, results find that the sweet spot for PIPEs are the firms that are unprofitable but 
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have high future potential growth. Lastly, log of deal size and percent acquired are both 
significant at the 1% level. 
Compared to the Hertzel-Smith model, both specifications have the same amount 
of predictive power.6 Hertzel and Smith also include two additional variables that 
measure the impact of change in ownership structure. They include a binary variable that 
represents if the placement used restricted shares, which is significant at 1%, and a 
variable for management buyer, which is not statistically significant. The sign, power, 
and magnitude of the coefficients in the new specification are for the most part consistent 
with the original model. The main difference is the number of observations. Because the 
Herzel-Smith paper uses a more comprehensive dataset, they were able to achieve more 
observations.  
Lastly, model (6) combines elements of each regression. The model explains 72% 
of the variation in discount, but only has 23 observations. The results from this regression 
corroborate the findings from the previous specifications. “Generating Revenue; Not 
Profitable” and “Profitable” are both significant at 1%. Credit rating B+ becomes 
significant at 1% but is likely due to the small sample size. Credit rating C remains 
significant at 1%. Log of deal size is negative, as expected, due to economies of 
information. Neither percent acquired nor single investor are significant, indicating that 
they are weak predictors of the discount.  
                                                 
6 The R^2 of the Hertzel-Smith model is 41.3%. This is a difference of 0.02 compared to the 
specification in this paper.  
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D. Performance 
Lastly, Table 7 shows the abnormal return for several different investment 
periods. Abnormal return is measured using both a CAR. Buy-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) and the Patell Z of the CAR are included as a robustness check. As with a 
normal Z test, the CAR Patell Z (hereon, Z) tests for a difference in distributional mean. 
In this case, it is testing if the CAR is significantly different than the market return. This 
test is unique in that it standardizes the event period using the standardized CAR, so each 
period can be compared.  
CAR is positive and highly significant in all of the event periods. For shorter 
periods, including {-3, 10}, {-3, 0}, {0, 3}, and {0, 10}, it does not matter if a market 
investor had prior information. Simply trading on the new information and holding until 
day 10 generates exceptional abnormal returns of 9.93%. In fact, even if an investor has 
prior information about the PIPE announcement and trades on it over the {-3, 0} period, 
he or she would generate the least amount of abnormal return.  
However, BHAR tends to have better properties in longer-run event studies (Gur-
Gershgoren, Hughson, Zender, 2008). Even though the CAR is positive and significant in 
the {0, 150}, {0, 300}, and {0, 500} day periods, the mean BHAR decreases 
exponentially as time increases. Further, the Z becomes relatively less significant. 
Therefore, long-run buy-and-hold strategies do not perform well. This is likely due to 
substantial new information about firms that gets incorporated into the returns. Perhaps 
the PIPE is unsuccessful, or perhaps the firm mismanages the new capital and undergoes 
Chapter 11.  
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Overall, investors react exceedingly well when firms announce their intention to 
raise capital. However, abnormal returns are poor in the long run because material new 
information drastically affects the firms.  
V. Conclusion 
This study explores PIPEs as a method of financing for firms, specifically in 
regard to the placement discount. Overall, the study agrees with previous literature. PIPE 
investors still enjoy sizeable discounts and large abnormal returns.  
The results agree with the Hertzel and Smith Information Hypothesis. Firms that 
are more difficult to value tend to have deeper placement discounts. This difficulty of 
valuation manifests in poor firm performance, such as poor credit rating, high book to 
market ratios, and negative net income.  
The key difference between firms that place equity at a discount versus a 
premium lie in the future earning potential of the company. The firms themselves are not 
exactly different, contrary to the hypothesis, but their growth prospects are. Deal size is 
an important explanatory variable here. Larger deals likely convey a higher degree of 
financial distress. Additionally, having too much debt relative to equity is a dangerous 
factor that is likely hard to overcome in the future. On the other hand, firms placed at a 
discount had positive EBITDA margins, as shown by the regression models, and other 
signs of future profitability.  
One important limitation in the study is the small amount of observations. The 
data from Pitchbook is useful, but not as comprehensive as other sources. PrivateRaise, 
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which is used in a number of other studies, seems to be the best source for future research 
on PIPEs.  
This study has opened various areas for future study. Earlier in this paper I 
brought up the question of why firms wait to execute the PIPE after its announcement. 
An event study would be an interesting topic to pursue to understand if firms benefit 
twice from positive information effects.  
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VII. Tables and Figures 
Table 1 - Variable Descriptions 
Variable Class Variable Name or 
Category* 
Variable Description 
Independent 
Variables 
Discount (Stock price 10 days after PIPE announcement – PIPE 
share price) / Stock price 10 days after PIPE 
announcement. 
  Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
Cumulative abnormal return on a stock using a Fama-
French three-factor model. The CAR period is 
specified as {t0, t1}. 
Dependent 
Variables 
Percent acquired Percentage stake acquired. 
  PIPE share price The share price that the investor purchased shares at. 
  Deal Class A categorical variable describing the purpose that a 
firm engaged in a PIPE. Reasons include: Corporate, 
Hedge Fund, Venture Capital, Private Equity, and 
Other. 
  Single Investor Binary variable if the PIPE only had a single investor. 
  Market Capitalization Share price * number of shares outstanding 30 days 
prior to PIPE announcement. 
  Deal Size Total dollar amount in ‘000s that a firm raised with 
the PIPE. 
  Raised to Date Total dollar amount in ‘000s that a firm has raised, 
inclusive of the PIPE. 
  Employees Number of employees contemporaneous to PIPE. 
  Number of Investors Total number of PIPE investors. 
  Number of New 
Investors 
Number of PIPE investors who have not previously 
invested in the firm before.  
  Profitability Measures* Revenue, Gross Profit, Net Income, EBITDA, Total 
Debt, EBITDA Margin, Market Capitalization. All 
are from the quarter prior to the PIPE.  
  Firm Age Calculated as 2019 – founding year 
  Financial Distress 
Measures* 
Cash Flow Margin, Cash Flow / Total Debt, Cash 
Ratio, Interest Coverage Ratio, Long Term Debt / BV 
Equity, Quick Ratio, Return on Equity, D/E, Credit 
Rating. All are from the quarter prior to the PIPE. 
  Book / Market Equity Book value to market value of equity in quarter prior 
to PIPE. 
* Denotes a category header. 
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Table 2 - Independent Variable Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min Max Obs 
Deal Size 153.29 25 420.78 0.03 3700.00 149 
Percent Acquired 17.64 15.2 10.30 5.00 49.80 46 
Raised to Date 318.89 131.01 638.34 0.03 3973.01 148 
# Employees 2353.85 223.50 6675.35 4.00 56000.00 126 
# Investors 1.93 1 1.58 1.00 8.00 149 
# New Investors 1.71 1 1.21 1.00 7.00 121 
Revenue 849.87 50.57 3260.00 0.00 32363.00 129 
Gross Profit 196.49 28.09 403.46 -133.23 2172.67 84 
Net Income 42.27 -13.36 848.35 -1921.95 8600.00 130 
EBITDA 23.70 -8.18 253.56 -1479.79 1005.37 113 
Total Debt 6090.46 53.68 47656.92 0.00 483732.00 103 
EBITDA Margin -1355.41 -15.54 4681.75 -33060.14 108.37 99 
Firm Age 34.67 23 32.93 4.00 166.00 144 
Market Capitalization 196.12 20.69 755.89 1.45 6457.22 105 
Book / Market Equity 0.71 0.401 0.80 0.01 5.21 83 
Cash Flow Margin -12.54 -0.09 53.01 -374.61 1.43 76 
Cash Flow / Total Debt -1.08 -0.06 2.63 -13.10 0.86 85 
Cash Ratio 10.03 1.05 54.33 0.01 450.94 69 
Interest Coverage Ratio -259.66 -1.25 875.11 -4780.30 220.54 47 
Quick Ratio 10.58 2.19 54.32 0.08 451.47 69 
Return on Equity -0.80 -0.43 1.76 -13.86 0.72 84 
Total Debt / Equity 3.04 0.98 5.59 -9.74 24.34 88 
Single Investor  61.00 1 49.00 0.00 100.00 149 
All financial metrics are in millions, except for ratios, percentages, and per-share items.  
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Table 3 - PIPE Industry Trends 
Figure 1 - PIPEs by Year: In-Sample 
 
 
Figure 2 - Change in PIPEs by Year: 
In-Sample 
 
 
Figure 3 – PIPEs by Year: Out-of-
Sample
 
 
Figure 4 – Change in PIPEs by Year: 
Out-of-Sample
 
 
Figure 5 – PIPEs by Sector 
 
 
Figure 6 – Time Between Deal 
Announcement Date and Execution
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Figure 7 – Distribution of Discounts and Premia 
This table presents a histogram of the independent variable Discount. Positive number represent 
discounts and negative numbers represent premia. The data is winsorized to three standard deviations to 
remove outliers. 
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Table 4 - Summary Statistics of Discounts and Premia 
This table looks at PIPE discounts from three lenses: in the aggregate, discount-only, and premium 
only. Due to how Discount is calculated, all positive numbers represent discounts, and all negative numbers 
represent premia.  
 
Aggregate Discount Premium 
Count 156 106 50 
Mean 6.68% 17.08% -15.35% 
S.D. 23.28% 17.94% 17.23% 
Min -75.22% 0.00% -75.22% 
25% -0.88% 7.09% -18.37% 
50% 7.09% 10.18% -10.56% 
75% 17.98% 24.14% -1.73% 
Max 99.77% 99.77% -0.42% 
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Table 5 - Discount Magnitude on Firm Characteristics 
This table presents PIPE discounts and premia grouped by different firm characteristics. Each 
grouping is performed on the available data, so the sum of the grouping’s aggregate count does not 
necessarily equal the total number of observations.  
  Aggregate Discount Premium 
Characteristic Grouping Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count 
Firm Industry 
Business Products 
and Services 
20.45% 9 20.45% 9   
 Consumer Products 
and Services 
0.98% 12 21.48% 6 -19.52% 6 
 Energy 11.10% 13 30.44% 9 -32.41% 4 
 Financial Services 7.79% 25 17.56% 18 -17.34% 7 
 Healthcare 3.62% 34 21.09% 18 -16.03% 16 
 IT 0.13% 6 7.85% 3 -7.60% 3 
 Materials and 
Resources 
3.32% 3 17.02% 1 -3.53% 2 
Net Income Negative 7.77% 74 23.77% 46 -18.51% 28 
 Positive 3.34% 28 12.77% 18 -13.63% 10 
Credit Rating A- 13.53% 5 13.53% 5   
 B+ 3.51% 9 5.83% 7 -4.62% 2 
 B 22.89% 7 22.89% 7   
 B- 4.86% 10 11.63% 7 -10.95% 3 
 C 2.76% 32 19.37% 18 -18.58% 14 
Percent 0-10 -8.82% 7 11.66% 2 -17.01% 5 
Acquired 10-20 11.29% 20 24.59% 14 -19.75% 6 
 20- 21.28% 6 21.28% 6   
Deal 0-5 5.67% 10 15.94% 6 -9.72% 4 
Size 5-10 36.85% 8 36.85% 8   
 10-15 11.24% 9 21.02% 6 -8.32% 3 
 15-20 28.27% 11 31.84% 10 -7.46% 1 
 20-100 -0.59% 31 14.16% 18 -14.42% 13 
 100- -2.32% 33 14.51% 22 -25.17% 11 
Book / Market 0-0.2 2.58% 21 19.32% 12 -19.74% 9 
 0.2-0.4 3.02% 18 13.93% 10 -10.61% 8 
 0.4-0.7 9.80% 11 21.42% 7 -10.53% 4 
 0.7-1 3.76% 9 10.99% 8 -54.08% 1 
 1- 9.00% 21 15.86% 16 -12.97% 5 
Market 0-10 19.19% 38 31.44% 27 -10.87% 11 
Capitalization 10-100 1.93% 41 12.13% 28 -20.04% 13 
 100-1000 -7.26% 19 13.25% 8 -22.18% 11 
 1000- -0.47% 4 28.57% 1 -10.15% 3 
Debt / Equity -0 17.46% 6 31.20% 4 -10.01% 2 
 0-1 4.85% 37 19.84% 22 -17.13% 15 
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 1-3 4.86% 19 11.55% 13 -9.64% 6 
 3-10 4.39% 14 16.47% 10 -25.81% 4 
 10- 11.08% 9 15.05% 7 -2.82% 2 
Investor Type Single Investor 4.80% 60 22.76% 37 -24.07% 23 
 Multiple Investors 9.06% 42 17.83% 27 -6.72% 15 
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Table 6 - Regression Models 
Credit rating is a binary variable that equals 1 if a firm’s credit rating equals the respective rating. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
0.331* 
(0.169) 
0.394** 
(0.175) 
0.332** 
(0.133) 
0.292** 
(0.132) 
-0.306 
(0.188) 
-0.115 
(0.172) 
Generating 
Revenue; Not 
Profitable 
    0.408** 
(0.160) 
0.533* 
(0.079) 
Profitable     
0.295** 
(0.128) 
0.475* 
(0.043) 
Credit Rating B+   
-0.096 
(0.067) 
-0.085 
(0.065) 
 
0.455* 
(0.058) 
Credit Rating B   
-0.083 
(0.066) 
-0.073 
(0.066) 
 
-0.201 
(0.117) 
Credit Rating B-   
0.037 
(0.072) 
0.039 
(0.069) 
 
0.094 
(0.123) 
Credit Rating C   
-0.174* 
(0.087) 
-0.193** 
(0.092) 
 
-0.149* 
(0.073) 
Book / Market 
Equity 
  0.018 
(0.026) 
0.034 
(0.030) 
0.036 
(0.033) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
Cash Flow Margin    
-0.005** 
(0.003) 
  
Ln(Deal Size)  
0.044* 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.009 
(0.024) 
-0.039* 
(0.019) 
-0.049* 
(0.007) 
Ln(Market Cap) 
-0.101* 
(0.037) 
-0.149* 
(0.051) 
-0.051** 
(0.021) 
-0.041* 
(0.021) 
  
Percent Acquired 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
  0.012* 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
Percent Acquired 
* Ln(Market Cap) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
    
Single Investor     
0.030 
(0.107) 
-0.050 
(0.093) 
Debt / Equity    
-0.002 
(0.005) 
  
Obs 33 33 58 56 27 23 
Pr(F-value) 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.003 
Adj R-squared 0.294 0.314 0.226 0.241 0.416 0.720 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 – PIPE Performance 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
for different event periods. Day 0 represents the PIPE announcement date. All of the statistics are 
normalized to the respective event period’s end date. The Patell Z is included as a robustness check for 
CAR. 
Information Status Event Period Mean CAR Mean BHAR Patell Z 
With Prior Information {-3, 30} 19.64% 19.78% 6.24 
 {-3, 10} 9.89% 10.72% 6.69 
 {-3, 0} 4.76% 4.66% 6.75 
No Prior Information {0, 3} 8.97% 9.80% 11.45 
 {0, 10} 9.93% 10.77% 7.79 
 {0, 60} 14.02% 10.03% 5.05 
 {0, 150} 20.07% -6.27% 4.12 
 {0, 300} 13.43% -227.35% 3.36 
 {0, 500} 22.55% -481.65% 3.63 
 
